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Honorable David Roberti 
Chairman 
Senate Rules Committee 
Room 400, State Capitol 
Dear Senator Roberti: 
t 
The Senate Advisory Commission on Cost Control in State 
Government herewith transmits its third report to the Senate 
Rules Committee -- a report on The state's Regulation of 
Financial Institutions. 
This study was undertaken by a subcommittee of the Commission 
chaired by M. Larry Lawrence. The work of the Subcommittee was 
reviewed and approved by the Commission at its last meeting. 
Members of the Subcommittee were Jerry Aspland, Carl Blomquist, 
and Creaser. The Commission wishes to express its gratitude 
to John B. McNeece III and A. Vincent s iano, pro bono 
consultants to the Commission, for their contributions to the 
research and preparation of this report. In addition, the 
ion to thank Elisabeth Kersten, Olsan, 
Richard Damm and Jason Warburg of the Senate Office of Research 




THE STATE'S REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
of 
The Senate Advisory Commission on Cost Control 
in State Government 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions 
Chair: M. Larry Lawrence 
Members: Jerry A. Aspland 
Carl A. Blomquist 
Phil Creaser 
Senate Advisory Commission on Cost Control in State Government 
Chair: Milton G. Gordon 
Members: Jerry A. Aspland 
Jerry Ayers 
John M. Basler 
Carl A. 
Alan I. Casden 
Anne Charles 
Jerry c. Chang 
Harry Cooper 
Phil Creaser 








A. Alan Post 
Manning J Post 
Thomas E. Rankin 
Diane N. Starr 
Daniel Van Voorhis 
Staff Consultants: Jeremy L. Olsan, Senate Office of Research 
Jason c. Warburg, Senate Office of Research 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Q • • • 1 
PREFACE • ~~~~ ••••••••• " ••••••••••••••••••••••• ., •••••••••• a •• " • .. • • 4 
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF STUDY ...•....•..••.••••..•.•..... 5 
Introduction to Issues 
Purpose of Study 
ORGANIZATION OF STUDY. . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 8 
THE CONTEXT OF STATE REGULATION. . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Deregulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Business Developments in Banking and 
The Savings and Loan Industry ...................... l3 
Industry Performance and the Insurance Funds .•.......... l4 
State Financial Supervision in the Era 
of Deregulation ............................. ....... 16 
CALIFORNIA'S FINANCIAL REGULATORY PROCESS ..•.....•......•.... l8 
STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT .....•.......................... 18 
Legal Mandate ..................................... . 18 
Funding and Staffing ............................... l8 
Institutional Failure Trends in California ......... 20 
Costs to the State of Bank Failures ................ 22 
Strategic Plan 1 88 ................................. 23 
Implementation of the Strategic Plan ............... 24 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT ......... 25 
Recommendations 1 - 12 
DEPARTMENT OF SAVINGS AND LOAN .......................... 31 
Legal Mandate . ....................................... 31 
Funding . ........................................... 31 
Staffing and Examinations .......................... 33 
Institutional Failure Trends in California ......... 35 
Costs to the State of Savings and Loan 
Association Failures ........................... 37 
Eclipse of the Department .......................... 38 
The Need for a Long-Term Departmental Plan ......... 38 
i 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF SAVINGS AND LOAN ... 0 
Recommendations 13 - 20 
COMBINING THE BANKING AND SAVINGS AND LOAN REGULATORY 
FUNCTIONS • o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • o • • • o • e e e • • lil! o o o • o • e o • 4 4 
NOTES ON METHODOLOGY ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 6 
ii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Banks and savings and loans have failed at an unprecedented 
rate over the past five years. The recent upheavals in the 
financial services industry are seen by some as threatening the 
stability of our entire financial system. In order to minimize 
the adverse effects of these upheavals on Cali , the State 
needs to take on an aggressive reform program a at 
strengthening the supervisory abilities of our financ 
regulatory agencies. 
over the past decade there has been substantial 
deregulation of the financial services industry and changes 
the financial services business, factors which 
increasing competitive pressure on banks and 
In addition, the large number of institutional over the 
past few years has created major problems for the federal 
insurance funds and the industry as a whole. The Commiss 
believes that the time has come to evaluate whether banks and 
savings and loans have too many powers. It is apparent that 
deregulation has invited abuses and mismanagement. The 
Legislature should review its deregulatory actions and determine 
whether the law should be changed. This decision should be 
based on what is good for the citizens .of California, not the 
preferences of the industry. 
The significant changes that have taken place in the 
financial industry in recent years have made the supervision of 
financial institutions both more important and more difficult. 
The State needs to take steps to improve the supervisory 
capabilities of the Departments of Banking and Savings and Loan. 
state Banking Department 
As of February 1988, the State Banking was re-
sponsible for supervising 389 institutions and a total of $265 
billion in assets. The Department has 
meeting its objectives known as 11 
and has a sound set of goals under that Nevertheless, 37% 
of the banks ated by the suf ient 
trouble to be aced on the Department's " 
recommendations of the Commission with 
Department, discussed in detail in the body of the report, are 
summarized below: 
• That the Legislature and the Department re-evaluate whether 
the Department's existing resources allow it to adequately 
supervise its licensees; 
• That the Department take a number of to 
recent findings that the principal causes for bank failure 
are fraud and misconduct; 
1 
the 
• That the Department examine all licensee at 
least once a year, and institutions 
"troubled" every six months; 
and the Department cons 
means of providing sal and 




• That the ful implement 
the Department of Personnel Administrat 
improving examiner salaries and benefits, 
additional authority from DPA for filling and reclassifying 
certain examiner classes, and reassess whether career 
counseling program is meeting the needs of its employees; 
• That the Legislature provide to the Department a $100,000 
appropriation to increase examiner training which was cut 
from the 1988-89 budget; and 
That the Department conduct a thorough of 
sources of information and negotiate greater access to 
federal information sources. 
Department of Savings and Loan 
As of the close of 1987, the Department of Savings and Loan 
supervised 137 state-chartered savings and loans with $147.9 
billion in assets. The Department does not have an 1 
strategy for its regulatory program and appears to have an 
The 
and 
number of in 1 of the 
had to under some s 
But the s 
below: 
That, as the current of the 
assessing funds from the Savings and Loans 
is fundamentally flawed, the 
's funding mechanism, 
assessments to support the 
the General Fund 
flexibility and the possib ity of General 
supplementing assessment proceeds, or by some other method 
such as franchise tax offsets; 
2 
• That the Department develop an 
the lines of the Banking Department's 
e That the Legislature and the Department create and fully 
staff a fraud unit within the Department, as recommended to 
the Banking Department above; 
• That the Department examine all licensee institutions at 
least once a year, and institutions it designates as 
troubled" every six months; 
e That the Legislature further shield the the Savings and 
Loan Commissioner from political pressures by changing the 
office from a pleasure appointment to a term appointment 
removable only for serious cause; 
• That the Department carry out joint examinations with the 
Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco where the 
Department focuses on operating areas unique to California 
institutions; 
e That the Department adopt personnel reforms similar to 
those recommended for the Banking Department above in the 
areas of hiring, compensation, training and career 
counseling; and 
e That the Department seek out additional information 
sources, as recommended to the Banking Department above. 
The Commission does not believe that a recommendation to 
consolidate the State's financial regulatory functions into a 
"Department of Financial Institutions" is warranted at this 
time. While the idea deserves further study, at present there 
are substantial differences in the Departments of Banking and 
Savings and Loan's regulatory structures, and in the way each 
uses and trains examiners. Finally, based on the experience in 
other states, the administrative cost savings potential of 
consolidation does not appear to justi such a recommendation 
at this time. 
Nevertheless, the entire area of of 
institutions should have a higher profile state government. 
The Governor and his administration must make a high 
priority and assure that energy and resources are focused on the 
very serious problems outlined in this report. 
3 
PREFACE 
The Senate Advisory Commission on Cost 
Government was created by Senate Resolution 
to study, analyze, and make recommendations on cost 
state government. SR 40 directed the Commission to 
ways to increase efficiency, reduce costs, enhance 
administrative accountability and control, and 





Like the federal Grace Commission, the Commission has been 
directed by SR 40 to forge private and public sector efforts to 
control the costs of and increase the efficiency of government. 
The mission statement adopted by the 
defines project selection criteria: the 
potentially effect improvements in multiple agencies ... " and 
11 improve services and I or programs permitting them to operate 
more effectively within existing resource levels." 
With these goals in mind, the Commission selected 
topic of analysis the regulation of Cali 1 s 
institutions. 
The Commission is indebted to John B. McNeece III and A. 
Vincent Siciliano for the many hours of toil and effort 






and loan area, 
of abating. the 
l have to 





as $85 continue to rise, ranging 
l l 
from $20 billion to as high 
But federal the 
consequences of The 
regulators in Cali the federal level, to 
and correct the the regulatory 
the failures to occur in the first place. The State 
must the future and determine how it can improve the 
regulatory institutions to lessen the of 
s the financial industry. 
There much at stake for Cali to iso-
late and solve these problems. According to the State's Depart-
ment of , 37% of the banks chartered in California as of 
March 1988 were judged to be in less than satisfactory financial 
condition, with about 17% in serious trouble. The Department of 
and Loan reported that 42% of the examinations conducted 
during the 1986-87 fiscal year were considered 
em" exams. For 1986 and 1987, failures by California s & 
almost 30% of the total national S & L failures.2 
The recent bailout and merger of American Savings and Loan of 
Stockton alone cost $2 billion, and the institution is still far 
from being out of trouble. 
called for. of 
resources to cope 
face the future. 
1 




or theme in of financial institutions 
11 t)he a system carries a public or 
responsibility" idates "a government role in 
the system. 11 3 institutions within the 
of the State Department and the Department 
of Savings and Loan an enormous on the economy of 
California. As of February B, 1988, the State Banking 
Department was for ing 280 state-chartered 
banks with $92 bil ion in , 100 foreign banking 
corporations with $66 bill assets, and 19 trust companies 
within supervised banks $107 billion in fiduciary 
assets.4 As of December 31, 1987, the Department of Savings and 
Loan supervised 137 savings and loans with 
$147.9 billion in assets 5 or respons lity of the two 
departments is to protect and soundness of the 
financial institutions respective jurisdictions. 
This serves to protect from losses due to insti-
tutional failures, and the entire financial system. 
The Commission 
State and the publ 
agencies 
Department of Savings 
answer, but it is 
However 
current situation 
evaluate whether financial 
It is 
abuses and mismanagement 
over the long run, costs to 
reduced by strengthening state 
State Department and the 
is by no means the entire 
step. 
changes in the current 
the state's financial 
the severity of the 
demands that the Legislature 
institutions in California have too 
expansion of powers the 
years has invited 
should review current law 
3 Henry Kaufman, Brothers, Speech to The u.s. 
Senate Committ•'e on Banking, July 1987. 
4 Howard i Superintendent of Banks, 
"Background Paper on The Operations of The State Banking 
Department," February 8, 1988. 
5 Letter, Department of Savings and Loan to The Commission, 




ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
study 1 present a statement of the context in 
the State Banking Department and the Department of Savings 
carry out their supervisory function. This 
or regulatory changes over the past decade, 
changes within the financial services industry, and 
large numbers of institutional failures. These factors make 
supervisory function increasingly important, yet at the same 
time increasingly fficult. The study then reviews the 
operations of the State Banking Department and the Department of 
Savings and Loans and provides a number of strong 
recommendations for enhancing supervisory capabilities of 
these Departments. The study closes with comments concerning the 
possible consolidation of the two departments. 
8 
there have been 
affect financ 
bus There have also been a 
failures have created major 
funds and for the financial 
These changes have made the 
State Banking Department and the 
Loan much more important, but also 
passed in the 1930s, augmented by restraints 
the federal regulatory authorities, established a 
competition among financial institutions, 
{l) limitations on deposit interest rates, (2) 
restrictions on the financial products that banks and savings 
and could offer, and (3) geographical restrictions. Under 
the technological change and competition from 
19 
, regulatory regime began to erode in 
crumbled more rapidly in the 1970's and 1980's.6 
gave the Federal Reserve the authority to 
ceilings on time and savings depos These 
gave financial institutions a protected 
source of funding. When high inflation in the 
70's and the 1980's led to double-digit interest 
above the ings, securities firms and insurance 
to offer investment vehicles which paid market 
served as alternatives to 
order 
under pressure from these 
smantle the rate ceil In 
ation and Control 





products and to 
cost of funds 
previously been 
institutions to f 
above the cost of 
substantial 









directed the DIDC 
, which it 
accounts ( 11 MMDAs 11 ) 
effective 
, and successfully 
lowed 
new investment 
base, it also raised 
which had 
for financial 










cards, and make 
1982, Congress authorized 
more consumer loans, make 
own property to lease, 
B D. Kidwell, R Peterson, Financial Institutions, Markets 
and Money, 1984, at p. 281 
9 Ibid. at 462. 





were not regulated by a state 
observers felt that this added up 
loans into fundamentally different 
than had been when the was created. 
result of of the law was that 
and loans increased from 106 
1982 to the current level of 137 associations.l3 
some power to expand products through the 
Act of 1982, which gave banks more power to 
14 National banks and aff iates of bank 
also obtained some add ional powers through 
administrative interpretations promulgated by 
ler of the Currency and the Federal Reserve 
industry has made a concerted effort to expand 
participate in the securities business. The 
been the Glass-Steagall Act, a law 1933 in 
and the 
favorable interpretations from the 
and the Federal Reserve Board, 
courts, bank affiliates have been permitted to 
brokerage, private placement of commercial 















, that the 
the interests 




to offer a much in order 
rema ive 
At the same time, ation has put the financ 
services industry under competitive pressure which it did not 
face before. We can make two conclusions about deregulation: 
(1) It has blurred the traditional institutional lines between 
banks, savings and loans, and other financial service providers. 
(2) It has allowed industry competition to increase. 
1 one consequence of the increased competition is 
that many banks and savings and loans have undertaken 
questionable actions to increase profits or simply to maintain 
solvency. A recent congressional study found that misconduct 
caused or contributed to "at least one-third (and probably more) 
of commercial bank failures and over three-quarters of all S&L 
insolvencies.l6 Deregulation has clearly to 
development by making it easier for financial institutions to 
get into trouble, whether through mismanagement or outright 
fraud. 
2. BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BANKING AND SAVINGS AND LOAN 
INDUSTRIES 
Banks have come under significant pressure as a result of 
competition from other financial service providers. For 
example, banks have lost a significant portion of traditional 
short and medium term business lending to the securities 
markets. To a significant extent, the issuance of commercial 
paper and other securities has taken the place of commercial 
bank borrowing for major businesses.l7 The decline in lending 
opportunities has caused banks, in some instances, to lend to 
more risky enterprises. It has also put banks under pressure to 
expand their product offerings and to expand geographically in 
order to make up for lost lending. Riskier lending and new 
products, if not properly managed, can increase the general risk 
level for banks, raising safety and soundness concerns. 
More , banks are now fac 
non-banking and even non-f ial firms. 





of such companies as General 
in resident f 
commercial banks' percentage 
from 
, le the finance 
Motors and General 
Reflect 
of all assets held by 
16 "Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct the Nation's 
Financial Institutions: Current Federal Efforts are Inadequate;" 
Report of the Committee on Government of the u.s. 
House of Representatives; October 13, 1988; p. 10. 

















the late s to 11.3 
a number of bank 
1985.2 There have 
The savings and loan business has been even harder hit, 
because of the dead or dying port of the business. 
, July 22, 1988, the media reported that the nation's 
savings and loans lost a combined $3.7 billion during the 
three months of 1988 -- the largest quarterly loss in 
and loans' history. more than two-thirds of all 
and loans remained profitable during the quarter the 
958 associations, mostly in Texas (and other 
Southwest states, including California), lost a total of $5.1 
ion. This loss offset the total earnings of profitable 
and loan in the country, $1.4 billion. Texas 
alone reported $3.5 billion of the total $5.1 
on the quarter.21 
Table 1 below summarizes the total bank and savings and 
loan failures in California and throughout the nation from 1983 
to 1987. 
Table 1 
BANK AND SAVINGS AND LOAN FAILURES 
CALIFORNIA AND NATIONWIDE 
and 
Bank Failures Loan Failures 
1987 5 184 12 48 
1986 2 138 15 49 
1985 6 120 2 34 
1984 5 79 1 27 
1983 4 48 0 53 
(Source: Cali State FDIC, 
Cali Savings and Loan 
Although for 1988 were not yet available 
press time for this report, as of November 17, 1988, 185 
banks and 143 savings and loans had failed nationally during 
1988, indicating a leveling-off in bank failures, but an 
accelerating crisis for the savings and loan industry. 
20 R. Litan, What Should Banks Do?, at p. 101. 






















could cause serious damage to the state's 
industry, there have been at few 
, outside of the Departments themselves, to ascertain how 
the State Banking Department and the Department of Savings and 
Loan are performing their statutorily mandated supervisory 
duties. This has occurred in spite of the fact that as 
deregulation progressed, supervision of institutions became more 
rather than less important, because of the increased 
opportunities for overextension and outright fraud on the part of 
ion officers. This study hopes to make a contribution in 
reviewing this important area. 
17 








and sound banking 
of payment 
, and (3) Business 
(BIDC0 1 s). The 
the State of California, 
within the State as 
of banks regulated 
BANKS AND BRANCHES REGULATED BY THE STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT, 












companie& and 42 trust 
holding $107 l 










1 in assets in 
supervises 100 
66 billion in assets; and 19 
departments within supervised banks 
assets. 
The of the 
by the state Banking Fund, 
state Banking Department are supported 
which is replenished annually by 
assessment of banks, 
checks, and trust companies; 
of money orders and travelers 
license and application fees; sale 
18 
and for i , such as bank 
The Department is administered by the Superintendent of 
Banks, who is appointed by the Governor. In the 1987-88 Fiscal 
Year, the Department has a staff of 182 personnel-years.23 Table 
3 zes the supervisory staffing of the department from 1982 
1987. 
Table 3 
NUMBER OF BANK EXAMINERS AND SUPERVISORS, 1982 - 1987 
Total 
Field Super-
Examiners Assistant Regional visorial 
Allocated staffed De:Euties De:Euties Sta 
1987 118 112 8 4 124 
1986 117 106 7 4 117 
1985 116 108 7 4 119 
1984 116 109 7 4 120 
1983 109 103 7 4 114 
1982 103 97 7 4 108 
(Source: state Banking Department and Legislative Analyst) 
Table 4 below shows the number and type of examinations 
performed by the Department from 1980 - 1987. The Department 
examines the operations of foreign banking corporations and trust 
companies, as well as performing separate examinations of the 
of banks. From the data below, 
roughly other 
banks are stringently, with examinations 
23 Legislative Analyst and The State Banking Department. 
"Personnel-years" refers to the total number of full-time 
positions allocated to a department, regardless of how work is 
broken down in practice. 
19 
2 9 
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1982, over 23 state 
Table 5 
BANK FAILURES, FEDERAL VS. STATE CHARTERED INSTITUTIONS 
1983 - 1988 YEAR TO DATE 
Calendar State National California u.s. 
Year Banks Banks Total Total 
1987 5 2 7 184 
1986 2 5 7 138 
1985 6* 1 7 120 
1984 5 1 6 79 
1983 4 1 5 48 
* Does not include one office of a foreign banking corporation 
that failed in Canada, necessitating the liquidation of the 
California operation by the Superintendent. 
(Source: State Banking Department; FDIC) 
Table 6 
FAILED AND MERGED BANKS REGULATED BY STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT 
1983 - 1987 
Year Failed Merger* Total 
1987 5 6 11 
1986 2 3 5 
1985 6 2 8 
1984 5 4 9 
1983 4 7 11 
*Merged through regulatory enforcement action 
(Source: State Banking Department) 
According to the Banking Department, as of February 8, 1988, 
there are 45 state-chartered banks considered to be "serious 
problem situations" where, "unless corrections are effected, the 
bank could fail." The Department indicates that another 58 banks 
are considered to be in "less than satisfactory condition, 
although not quite as serious." Furthermore, "several" foreign 
















present in, the 
(and probably 











expenses of the 
in a separate 
, however, that 
"Background Paper 




Operations of the u.s. 
1988; p. 10. 
and 1987, the 
hours on banking 
13 500 
7 
5. Strategic Plan '88 
Overall, the State Banking Department appears to have 
clear objectives, substantial understanding of the conditions in 
the banking industry and the problems faced by the industry, and 
a sound plan for reaching its objectives 1 within the budget 
imposed by the Governor and the The 
Department should be commended for its strategic plan, discussed 
below. Two key issues for the Banking Department will be whether 
they will effectively implement "Strategic Plan 1 88, 11 and whether 
it has the resources to adequately supervise the banking 
industry, even with the efficient use of resources contemplated 
the plan. 
Earlier this year, Superintendent of Banks Howard Gould 
publicly presented the State Banking Department's "Strategic Plan 
'88 --Adapting to a Changing Financial Services Environment." 
This is the first long-range plan ever undertaken by the 
Department to actively manage change in the financial services 
industry. The plan is realistically based on the assumption 
that, in addition to the multitude of changes already brought on 
by deregulation, there will be ongoing change -- that the banking 
business is no longer the staid and predictable enterprise it 
once was, especially when interstate banking begins in 1990. 
The strategic plan also anticipates changes in industry 
performance, namely continued pressure for banks to remain 
profitable in an increasingly competitive environment. Industry 
changes will give banks more powers, creating "a need for the 
Department to supervise these increased powers effectively." The 
plan also considers changes in the California economy, citing 
population growth and California's position as a Pacific Rim 
finance center. 
The strategic plan s resources 
grow as fast as , and 
to develop Department at a faster pace and 
better training to cope new chal To 
these s, the Department's an enumerates four 
specific objectives: 
1) The Supervision Object 
2) The Human Resource Objective 
27 Letter to The Commission from 
















Summary, p. 4. 
4 
29 Howard Gould, 
on The Operations 
1988, p. 13. 






to focus new 













Department could use 
examination strategy 
"action plans" to 
"Strategic Plan 1 88." 
Plan 1 88, 11 Executive 
"Background Paper 
, 11 February 8 , 
2) Department agreement with the FDIC to j 
banks having assets of $1 billion or more 
reduce examination time; 
examine all 
further 
3) Internal office automation system (on-line by Fall of 
1988) • 
4) Departmental reorganization plan, which will include a 
realignment of workload between the offices, possible 
reclassification of certain positions, and restructuring of 
the training and consumer complaint sections.31 
In order to meet the Department's newly-established human 
resources objective, a new hiring strategy is being developed, 
and performance reviews will be based upon new and more explicit 
standards for each position. 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT* 
Guided by its new "Strategic Plan 1 88," the Department may 
be able to anticipate change and react, while maintaining the 
high standards in personnel and performance to regulate banks 
during these volatile economic times. The following 
recommendations relating to the implementation of the strategic 
plan will be of help: 
Supervision Objective 
RECOMMENDATION 1 - Adequacy of Resources. 
Although the Department contemplates efficient and effective 
deployment of its resources, it is still the case that since 
January 1982, 23 state banks have failed. In addition, 
Superintendent Gould reports that as of February 1988, there are 
45 state-licensed "serious problem banks" where, unless 
corrections are effected immediately, the banks may fail. 
Another 58 banks are in less than satisfactory condition, 
although "not quite as serious." Altogether, 37%, more than 1 
out of 3 state banks, are in trouble of some kind. At the same 
time, superintendent Gould has acknowledged that the Department 
is in need of additional personnel, including 14 new examiner 
positions. The Legislature and the Department must evaluate 
whether even with effective and efficient deployment of 
resources, the Department has enough resources to adequately 
supervise its licensees. 
31 b'd I 1 ., pp. 13-15. 
* NOTE: Recommendations 1 - 12 deal with the State Banking 
Department, while Recommendations 13 - 20 are addressed to the 





some kind, we 
believe that this is an insufficient amount of 
Department should examine every one of its 
once a year. nTroubled11 institutions should be examined at least 
every six months. Increasing the frequency of examinations 
should help the Department to detect problems earlier, as well as 
acting as a deterrent to those who might otherwise attempt fraud 
or other misconduct. 
Human Resource Objective 
The Department has suffered from a turnover of examiners and 
auditors. Significantly, 11.2% of all examiners and auditors (14 
personnel) left the Department in 1985-86 and 13.8% (17 
personnel) left in 1986-87. The Auditor General identified pay 
and benefits limitations and a lack of promotional opportunity as 
the primary causes for this high turnover. Steps have been taken 
to reduce turnover, but the Banking Department cannot attract and 
keep top examiner staff until salaries and benefits are 
comparable to the competition. Further steps must be taken to do 
more than simply reduce turnover. The Department must be able to 
offer better inducements than the federal government and remain 
within ball-park range of the private banks to lure away the top 
examiners and attract top new examiner trainees. 
RECOMMENDATION s - Provide Pay Comparable to the Private 
sector for Examiners and supervisory staff. 
The Department and the Legislature should consider all 
appropriate means of providing salaries and benefits to examiners 
and supervisory staff comparable to private sector equivalents. 
It is worth noting in this regard that there is precedent for the 
removal of these positions from civil service pay scales. The 
California Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) and the 
state Teachers Retirement System (STRS), in efforts to stop the 
exodus to the private sector of the top investment managers and 
financial analysts who manage these public funds, were successful 
in pushing legislation that exempted these personnel from the 
state civil service pay scale. The FHLB of San Francisco, faced 
with the same problem as PERS and STRS, succeeded in removing its 
supervisory personnel from civil service, thereby permitt 
higher salaries and better benefits. Because a number of State 
Banking Department personnel have left for employment with the 
FHLB of San Francisco, the Legislature and the Department should 
consider taking similar steps. If such an exemption or any other 
pay-augmenting measures are enacted, however, with them should 
come a new and more stringent performance review system for these 
employees, so as to allow continued justification for paying them 
higher salaries. 
RECOMMENDATION 6 - Personnel Salary Survey. 
The Department of Personnel Administration, at the request 
of the Legislature, completed a survey in November of 1987 
comparing wages, salaries, and benefits of examiner staffs at the 
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The Commission recommends that the be 
and fully funded, provided that examiner workload will allow 
maximum participation in the training program. 
Infrastructure Objective 
RECOMMENDATION 10 - Fraud Unit. 
The Department does not have a fraud unit. Two 
investigators, who may be given limited peace officer status by 
the passage of SB 2272 (Vuich), are currently in the budget for 
the upcoming Fiscal Year. These investigators would investigate 
various violations of law, including bank fraud, and enforce 
various laws administered by the Department. They would also 
investigate the backgrounds of persons applying for bank charters 
and other licenses issued by the Department. SB 2272 would allow 
these investigators to serve arrest warrants and have access to 
criminal records -- vital tools if they are to be effective in 
preparing cases that the Attorney General or local district 
attorneys will be willing to accept for prosecution. The 
Commission fully endorses SB 2722, and concurs with the need for 
Departmental investigators. However, much more is needed to 
effectively combat this serious problem. 
In light of the findings that fraud and insider abuse are a 
major reason for bank failure, the Department and the Legislature 
should work together to establish a special fraud unit, 
regardless of whether the investigator positions are funded or 
whether they receive peace officer status. The Commission 
believes that two investigators are not nearly enough, by 
themselves, to effectively address the fraud problem. A fraud 
unit, staffed by several full-time investigators, preferably with 
peace officer status, should also be staffed with its own 
secretarial support services and legal counsel. It is possible 
that existing Department resources could be assigned on a 
part-time basis to accommodate these needs; if not, the 
Legislature should provide the Department supplemental 
resources earmarked for this It is essential, to reduce 
the future cost of institutional failures to Cali 
taxpayers, for the Department to have a much better fraud 
detection and prevention capability than it has today. 
Information Objective 
RECOMMENDATION 11 - Focus on Problem Areas. 
The Department should focus on the key problem areas in the 
banking industry which have been recently reported to be 
contributors to bank failure, particularly fraud and misconduct, 
in order to identify the types of information that would provide 
an early warning of potential failure. The Department should 
then design and implement a strategy for maximizing its access to 
this type of information, including the use of investigators, 
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DEPARTMENT OF SAVINGS AND LOAN 
1. Legal Mandate 
The Department of Savings and Loan is responsible for 
regulating the activities and examining the financial records of 
the state-licensed savings and loan associations in order to 
protect the savings and investments of the public. The 
Department's policy statement expands this mandate to include 
Department assurance of the "continued financial growth of these 
associations consistent with public need and convenience.u33 
Table 7 shows the number of savings and loans regulated by the 
Department from fiscal year 1982-83 through fiscal year 1987-88. 
Table 7 






















(Sources: Department of Savings and Loan: Legislative Analyst) 
Currently there is in excess of $147.9 billion in assets in the 
State associations represented above. Associations convert these 
funds into residential, consumer and commercial building 
development and construction loans.34 
2. Funding 
The operations of the Department of Savings and Loan are 
supported from the Savings Association Special Regulatory Fund, 
whose revenues come primarily from an annual assessment of 
savings and loans, based upon the association's assets. These 
funds go toward examinations and bank oversight only, and a 
contingency reserve for economic uncertainty is maintained. The 
33 Letter to The Commission from Shirley Thayer, Department 
of Savings and Loan, Senior Staff Counsel, February 18, 1988, p. 
2 . 
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1988, pp. 213-216. 
According to the Legislative 
approximately 9% of the Department s 
of the annual assessment against the 
and Loan Association, which has been placed in receivership by 
the FSLIC pending its sale to new investors. The prospective 
owners plan to switch to a federal charter, thereby depriving the 
Department of American Savings' substantial assessment. Another 
large association has expressed interest in changing charter 
from that of a state-chartered savings and loan to that of a 
state-chartered bank. The Department's budget thus faces 
significant reduction and could be further adversely affected if 
the second association above were to exert pressure on the 
Department to decrease its assessment. 
The scenario in which a California savings and loan changes 
charter to either a federal savings and loan or a bank is 
becoming more and more common. As savings and loan officers see 
fewer benefits from the California state charter, it makes less 
and less sense to them to pay the added costs of state regulation 
without offsetting gains in the form of broader powers. The 
threat of charter-shopping by savings and loan has exacerbated 
the funding and staffing problems the Department now faces. Its 
budget needs are being held hostage to regulatory competition. 
Industry groups have put forth the argument that regulation 
by the state is duplicative. In addition to the Department of 
Savings and Loan, associations must be audited by independent 
auditors, in-house auditors, and the FSLIC on a regular basis. 
Each of those audits concentrates on different aspects of the 
association's operations, however, and the fact is that those 
institutions choose the state as a regulator, placing the state 
under the legal obligation to supervise them on behalf of the 
public. To the extent that regulation is necessary, the 
associations should be willing to both submit to examinations and 
pay for them. 
3. Staffing and Examinations 
Tables 8 and 9 below indicate that, 1987, the Department 
of Savings and Loan employed a total of 83 examiner and 
supervisory personnel, amounting to one examinat 
person per year. In contrast, the State 's 116 
examiners and assistant deputy exam completed 177 bank 
examinations, 50 foreign banking corporation ions, and 17 
trust company examinations during 1987. (See Table 4, 
"Examinations Performed by the Department of Banking"). These 
figures do not suggest that savings and loan examiners are less 
productive than bank examiners. Indeed, the disparity between 
the requirements and current difficulty of savings and loan 
versus bank examinations make such comparisons of questionable 
value. Nonetheless, our intuitive conclusion is that additional 
examiners in the Department of Savings and Loan may be needed in 
order to increase the frequency and effectiveness of supervision. 
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examinations increasing by 
number of examinations 
Senior Staff Counsel, 
performed fell by almost 9 percent, from 91 exams in 1983 to 83 
exams in 1987. 
According to the 1988-89 Governor's Budget, the Department 
estimates that it will perform 131 examinations, utilizing a 
total of 333 field visits, in Budget Year 1987-88. This appears 
to indicate that the Department plans to examine each 
institution under its supervision no more than once a year. 
Considering the fact that the industry is in serious condition 
by most accounts, it would be prudent for the Department to step 
up the frequency and detail of its examinations. The Commission 
is concerned that, without hiring additional examiners who 
already have some expertise, the Department will not be able to 
meet its goals for the year, nor its overall legal mandate. 
There is one more factor that should be noted in connection 
with extent of the Department's examination staff. A moratorium 
by the FSLIC on the licensing of new savings and loan in 
California, Texas, and Florida has been in effect since 
approximately 1984. The moratorium was reached by agreement 
with the Department. The provisions of the ban were that, until 
the savings and loan regulatory departments in these states 
could hire a sufficient number of examiners to adequately 
regulate associations, the FSLIC would not grant insurance to 
any new associations, thereby preventing them from being 
licensed by the states. 
According to the California Department of Savings and Loan 
the moratorium is still in effect, although the Department says 
it reached the agreed-upon examiner staffing levels some time 
ago. Department officials are unaware of the reasons for the 
continued ban, and note that the FSLIC has provided insurance to 
new associations in Florida and Texas in recent months. 
It is unclear why the FSLIC is still not granting insurance 
in California (the Department has not been openly critical of 
the continued ban), but if indeed one of the Department's 
principal objectives is "to assure the continued financial 
growth of these associations consistent with public need and 
convenience," it appears that in spite of raising the number of 
examiners (from 49 in 1984 when the moratorium began, to 66 in 
1988), the Department knows it is under pressure and is not 
truly capable of effectively regulating any more associations 
than currently exists. 
4. Institutional Failure Trends in California 
Table 10 below summarizes the number of failures of 
California chartered savings and loans and total failures 
throughout the nation from 1983 through 1987. It is clear from 
these data that California associations are over-represented. 
For 1986 and 1987 California failures comprised 28% of the total 
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House of Representatives; October 13, 1988; p. 34. 
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Neglected in these discussions is an l 
note: the onset of deregulation failed to 
increase in supervision. In fact, as 
gained expanded powers, supervision stayed the same or even 
decreased, inviting abuses of these powers. A key reason for 
the crisis in the industry today is the fact that oversight of 
the industry did not increase either quantitatively or 
qualitatively during a period when institutional operations were 
becoming increasingly complex and perilous. 
5. Costs to the state of savings and Loan Association 
Failures 
The annual costs to the State of savings and loan 
association failure are relatively ificant on the whole, 
but as they relate to the total budget of the Department, the 
costs become more telling. As represented in Table 11 below, 
the total cost, from June 1982 to December 1987, to the 
Department of Savings and Loan of the sale, closure, merger or 
bailout of insolvent savings and loans, was $3,226,514. This 
includes factors such as attorney's fees and consulting fees. 
The costs are established from estimates of time spent directly 
and indirectly, including costs incurred prior to and work after 
as a result of conservatorship or receivership, except that the 
costs incurred by the examination section of the Department are 
only for the immediate cost related to the takeover (i.e., day 
of takeover and time on premises). 
Costs of takeovers will, of course, vary depending on the 
circumstances and reasons for insolvency. Those takeovers which 
required legal actions also require extensive staff time to 
produce records, appraisals, and investigation for civil and 
criminal court filings. Some of these costs have extended into 
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discussed above, it 
benefit substantially 
the savings and loan 
industry, its mission, and its funding and staffing. The 
savings and loan industry is in the midst of difficult times, 
and is experiencing far greater difficulty than the banking 
industry. 
The Department is faced with serious funding limitations, 
an increasing number of association failures, and a declining 
number of total examinations per year. In order to address 
these ongoing problems, the Commission recommends that the 
Department develop two separate strategic plans similar to that 
recently completed by the State Banking Department, one based 
upon existing budget constraints and one which contemplates 
additional resources. 
Two plans are necessary because of continuing pressures on 
the Governor's budget. These pressures require any state agency 
to plan for operations using its existing budget and plan for 
the availability of additional resources, should they become 
available. The Commission does not suggest a third option, 
planning for a decrease in resources, because it is our opinion 
that the Department is currently operating at a level below the 
minimum it needs to perform its duties adequately. 
The Commission suggests utilizing the same type of 
organizational perspective developed by the Banking Department 
because it is designed well and allows for flexibility in 
creating alternative strategies: 





o SUPERVISION OBJECTIVE 




o INFRASTRUCTURE OBJECTIVE 
o INFORMATION OBJECTIVE 
We have included some recommended strategies to be 
considered within each overall objective. With the Department's 
expertise, many more will become necessary as a result of the 
assessment necessary to create a long-term plan. We discuss our 
recommendations in detail below. 
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RECOMMENDATION 13 - New Departmental Revenues. 
The Department presently 
receives in order to carry out its mission. The 
Department should seek alternative sources of 
funding. The Legislature and the Department should consider a 
number of options for augmenting the Department's funding. The 
Legislature could mandate assessments against the 
Department's licensees. or use the Department of 
corporations as a model and channel Department assessments 
through the General Fund. s budgeting mechanism, if 
implemented, would 1 to the Department's budget 
and permit the fund the Department according to 
regulatory needs, rather amount of assessments 
available to it. 
Alternatively, 
the franchise tax for 
associations, and 
should be explored. 
offset for assessments 
assessments more 
securing offsets against 
against California-chartered 
to the General Fund, 
permitted a franchise tax 
regulator, making the 
savings and loan industry. 
RECOMMENDATION 14 - Strategic Plan Within Existing 
Resources. 
The Strategic Plan 88 by the Banking Department 
provides a good model for the of savings and Loan, 
acting within the scope of its current resource levels. Should 
there be no change in the Department's funding levels, there 
should still be a comprehensive reconsideration of departmental 
priorities, acknowledging the regulatory requirements of an 
industry in up>.eaval. The Commission will not suggest an 
alternative plun for a reduction in departmental resources, as 
the current resource levels are below the minimum required for 
* NOTE: Recommendations 1 - 12 deal with the State Banking 
Department, while Recommendations 13 - 20 are addressed to the 
Department of Savings and Loan. 
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In this second strategic plan, the Department should 
evaluate, utilizing current and projected workload information 
based upon the most effective regulation, as opposed to the 
current situation, where the Department is staffed at the 
minimum necessary to carry out the letter of the law. The 
present situation in the industry will not allow the Department 
to be satisfied with meeting the minimal regulatory standards, 
and the mission of the Department, part of which is to assure 
continued financial growth of savings and Loan associations, 
will not tolerate it. The Department must seek additional funds 
in order to be proactive -- to meet the demands of the changing 
market -- instead of following its current reactive course. 
2. Supervision Objective 
RECOMMENDATION 16 - Fraud. 
The recent congressional report cited elsewhere in this 
report states that fraud and other forms of misconduct were 
responsible for at least 80% of savings and loan insolvencies 
between January 1984 and June 1987. savings and Loan 
Commissioner Crawford participated in these congressional 
hearings and is aware of their findings. Like the state Banking 
Department, the Department of savings and Loan should review the 
findings of this report in consultation with the Legislature, 
and working together, they should implement steps for improving 
the Department's ability to detect and respond to fraud, 
including establishing a fraud unit as recommended under 
Recommendation 19. In addition, the slature and the 
Department should j 
there is 
and whether 
ic where ci ti ens who 
fraudulent attention of enforcement are 
entitled to a percentage of any proceeds, would be an effective 
deterrent in this area. 
In addition, some members of the Commission felt strongly 
that jail sentences should be mandatory when officers of an 
institution are convicted of fraud or misconduct, and that upon 
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3. Human Resources Objective 
RECOMMENDATION 20 - Personnel Reforms. 
The same recommendations made earlier regarding the hiring, 
compensation, training, and career counseling of the Department 
of Banking are equally applicable to the Department of Savings 
and Loan. 
4. Infrastructure Objective 
RECOMMENDATION 21 - Fraud Unit. 
The recommendations identified earlier regarding the 
establishment of a fraud unit in the Department of Banking are 
equally applicable to the Department of Savings and Loan. 
Despite the widespread nature of the fraud problem in the 
savings and loan industry, the Department does not have a fraud 
unit. The Department and the Legislature should work together 
to establish a special fraud unit, staffed by several full-time 
investigators, preferably with peace officer status. This unit 
should also be staffed with its own secretarial support services 
and legal counsel. It is possible that existing Department 
resources could be assigned on a part-time basis to accommodate 
these needs; if not, the Legislature should provide the 
Department with supplemental resources earmarked for this 
purpose. It is essential, to reduce the future cost of 
institutional failures to California taxpayers, for the 
Department to have a much better fraud detection and prevention 
capability than it has today. 
5. Information Objective 
RECOMMENDATION 22 - Additional Information. 
In addition to the recommendations previously set forth for 
the Department of Banking, particularly the recommendation 
concerning forms and questionnaires on management policies and 
procedures, the Department of Savings and Loan should consider 
whether it has enough information on potential problem areas, 
including service corporations. We recommend that regulators 
get monthly computer data from institutions so that dangers can 
be spotted more quickly, and that automation be more thoroughly 
employed throughout the Department's operations. 
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COMBINING THE BANKING AND SAVINGS AND LOAN REGULATORY 
FUNCTIONS 
The notion of combining the banking and savings and loan 
regulatory functions was proposed in California as early as 
1976, by then Business, Transportation and Housing Secretary 
Donald Burns. The "Department of Financial Institutions," as it 
was to have been called, would have also overseen credit unions 
and other lending-trust firms. Four years before deregulation 
made this a top consideration in many states and the federal 
government, combining financial regulatory agencies was 
vehemently opposed by industry trade associations. 
One of the prime reasons for the proposal, Burns said at 
the time, is that "sometimes, with regulatory agencies, they 
tend to be co-opted by the industries they were designed to 
regulate. This has happened in many states and it may have 
happened here in California".38 In addition, he indicated that, 
because of competition, banks, savings and loans, and other 
financial institutions are "under tremendous pressure to become 
alike," and government has to "be ready for the future".39 
The future arrived in 1980, in the form of deregulation. Since 
that time, there have been efforts, many successful, at the 
state level to consolidate the functions of banking and savings 
and loan regulators into one state agency. 
However, in one of the most comprehensive studies 
undertaken on the subject of modernizing financial regulatory 
institutions, the State of New York's DeWind Commission 
recommended in a 1984 report that financial institutions be 
regulated by function -- that the separate activities of 
multi-service firms should be supervised and regulated by the 
appropriate state authority depending on the nature of the 
activity, rather than by the charter the institution holds. 
"Thus," they concluded, "the Commission firmly believes that the 
insurance agency activities in which banks may be authorized to 
engage should be supervised by the Insurance Department," and so 
on. 
At the federal level, Vice President George Bush chaired 
the "Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services," which 
recommended consolidation by eliminating the FDIC's role in 
examining and regulating state non-member banks. The Task Group 
recommended creating a new "Federal Banking Agency" within the 
Treasury Department, incorporating the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currenc}. These recommendations have not been 
implemented. 
38 Sacramento Bee, February 8, 1976, p. A1. 
39 Ibid. 
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In recent months, there has been cons debate 
and discussion regarding the consolidation of the two federal 
insurance funds, the FDIC and the FSLIC, primarily because of 
the weakness of the savings and loan fund, but also because of 
the blurring of institutional lines between banks and savings 
and loan. This debate has again raised the question of 
consolidation of the California state financial regulators. 
The Commission believes that the question of consolidating 
the state Banking Department and the Department of Savings and 
Loan should remain a topic for further consideration and study. 
However, we believe it would be premature at this stage to 
recommend consolidation because there remain substantial 
differences in the way the two Departments use and train 
examiners and in the regulatory structure governing each 
Department's functions and operations. In addition, the 
administrative cost savings potential may not presently justify 
the consolidation. 
Nevertheless, the entire area of regulation of financial 
institutions should have a higher profile in state government. 
The Governor and his administration must make this a high 
priority and assure that energy and resources are focused on the 
very serious problems outlined in this report. While merging 
the Departments might not make sense at this point, it is vital 
that their regulatory needs be recognized and met if the state 
is to effectively respond to the very serious problems present 
in California's financial industry today. 
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NOTES ON METHODOLOGY 
In completing this report, the Commission utilized a number 
of sources, conducting hearings, interviewing observers of the 
Departments of State Banking and Savings and Loan, and making 
written inquiries of the Departments. 
Witnesses attending meetings of the Subcommittee on 
Institutions and offering their insights on 
California's financial regulatory process included former 
Secretaries of Business, Transportation and Housing Don Burns, 
Richard Silberman, and Lynn Schenk, as well as Senate Majority 
Leader Barry Keene. 
Pro bono consultants to the Commission John B. McNeece III 
and A. Vincent Siciliano, along with Commission staff, conducted 
interviews with the following individuals: Howard Gould, 
Superintendent of Banks; William J. Crawford, Savings and Loan 
Commissioner; Dean Cannon, President, California League of 
savings and Loans; Gus Bonta, Executive Director, California 
Bankers' Association; and Michael Patriarca, Director, Agency 
Group, Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco. 
The Commission is grateful for the cooperation of the State 
Banking Department and the Department of savings and Loan. 
Responses to the Commission's extensive written inquiries were 
supplied by Steven suchil, Counsel and Legislative Coordinator 
of the State Banking Department, and Shirley Thayer, Senior 
Staff Counsel to the Department of Savings and Loan. 
Finally, the Commission gained valuable insights on 
personnel issues within the Departments from the September 1987 
report of the Auditor General entitled "A Review of Examiner, 
Auditor, and Appraiser Attrition in the State Banking 
Department, The Department of Savings and Loan, the Department 
of Corporations, and the Department of Real Estate." 
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